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“
F INGER OF G OD ”:
C.S. L EWIS AND H ISTORICAL J UDGMENT

RITTEN BY THE

P HILIP I RVING M ITCHELL

“I do not dispute that History is a story written by the finger of God. But have
we the text?”
—C.S. Lewis, ”Historicism” 105
“I do not suppose that the sixteenth century differs in these respects from any
other arbitrarily selected stretch of years. It illustrates well enough the usual
complex, unpatterned historical process; in which, while men often throw away
irreplaceable wealth, they not infrequently escape what seemed inevitable
dangers, not knowing that they have done either nor how they did it.”
—English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, Excluding Drama ([OHEL] 558)

I

N HIS OFT-CITED

1954 INAUGURAL ADDRESS as the Cambridge Professor of
Medieval and Renaissance Literature, “De Descriptione Temporum” [DT], C.S.
Lewis compared the work of historians to that of flower arranging: “I am less
like a botanist in a forest than a woman arranging a few cut flowers for the
drawing-room. So, in some degree, are the greatest historians. We can’t get into
the real forest of the past” (DT 3-4). According to Lewis, the practice of history
is an antiquarian display, rather than an axiomatic science. The best one can do
is attractively exhibit a number of examples from the past to entice an audience
to examine them closely. Expressed this way, Lewis’s confidence appears rather
low in the scope, even veracity, of history. He, like all historians, was subject to
what Erich Przywara has called a “creaturely metaphysic,” a suspended middle
in which ontological judgments of the nature of what happened in the past and
epistemological judgments that they happened circle back upon each other
(154).1 Our present knowledge of the past can never be absolute, certain, or godlike. Yet Lewis as a literary historian, in actual practice, expressed himself with
“the rhetoric of certitude” (Tandy chapter 4); that is, his history-writing relied
on generalizations and assertive judgments, and there are good reasons for his
For a further discussion of Lewis and historical judgment, see Mitchell, “‘Raised by
Implication’: C. S. Lewis’s Studies in Words and Historical and Moral Judgment,” and for
a further application of Przywara’s suspended middle to historical judgment see Mitchell,
“Civilizational Sickness and the Suspended Middle: R.G. Collingwood, Christopher
Dawson, and Historical Judgment.”
1
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method. Lewis’s distrust of scientific laws for history, rather than undercutting
his practice of literary history, existed alongside a basic, cautionary trust in
representing the past. His methods of history writing included offering an
overall plot, developing characters and corporate quasi-characters, and making
analogies with the present to increase readerly sympathy (or antipathy) with
long-gone cultures. In doing so, despite his strong rhetorical tendency to
generalize, Lewis did not place absolute faith in his historical narratives. They
were made to be argued with, supplemented, and even over-turned. To show
this in his practice, I will pay particular attention to three documents from
Lewis’s career as a literary historian: 1) his 1945 essay, “Addison”; 2) his twoday address in 1956 to the Cambridge Zoological Laboratory; and 3) the opening
introduction to his monumental English Literature in the Sixteenth Century,
Excluding Drama. But to do this, it will help to examine his overall attitude
toward historiography because, at first glance, his theory appears at odds with
what he actually wrote. That they were not entirely so requires a theological
structure to position his suspended middle of historical and ethical judgments.
THE TROUBLE WITH HISTORICISM
Lewis distrusted theories of historical change, including Christian
ones. In 1948, he had enthusiastically written to Christopher Dawson, the
Roman Catholic historian and social critic, about Dawson’s Gifford lectures,
which he had sent to Lewis. Lewis had already read the historian with
appreciation, finding much value in his analysis of political history (Letters
2.398), and Lewis clearly saw Dawson as a fellow Christian intellectual opposed
to the spirit of the age. Lewis admired Dawson’s treatment of Hegelianism and
evolutionary developmentalism, as well as his work “on the Humanists [which]
seems to me particularly sound” (Letters 3.1584). Yet despite this high praise of
Dawson’s work, Lewis’s own conclusions about the nature of history, if taken
seriously, eroded the foundations for such a project as Dawson’s. In October
1950, Lewis published his essay “Historicism,” in which he condemned the
pursuit of historical, developmental causes, giving a stipulative definition for
“historicism” that would have surprised much of his audience (Bebbington 180).
It certainly surprised Dawson. Instead of decrying the cultural relativism
associated by many with historicism, Lewis described it as “the belief that men
can, by the use of their natural powers, discover an inner meaning in the
historical process” (“Historicism” 100). Lewis had a different, if related, target
than Dawson. “The mark of the Historicist,” he complained, “is that he tries to
get from historical premises conclusions which are more than historical;
conclusions metaphysical or theological or […] atheo-logical” (100-101). In
particular, Lewis worried about Christian readings of history in an axiomatic
fashion. Dawson in response argued that historicism (i.e. metahistory) was not
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the same as idealism, and that German liberal Protestantism and German
Idealism had muddled things. He gave Lewis credit for opposing such
philosophical positions that mistook their own philosophy for Christianity, yet
he insisted that a Christian understanding of history was compatible with an
Augustinian model of time and society (Dawson 245-53).
For Dawson, it was clear that metahistory was not universal history,
and yet sociology could play an important role (307-310). Lewis, on the other
hand, discounted any pretense to a science or philosophy of history, even
though he affirmed a general theological shape to its course. History, he held, is
an interpretive study of the particulars; it cannot be an attempt to explain the
deep causes or developmental pattern of historical forces. The normal means of
historians, he insisted, included inferences of unknown events from known ones
or future outcomes from past ones, though the later were misguided, even if
allowable. Metahistorical claims could not be advanced without a
comprehensive knowledge of all historical information. No one can know the
totality of history because we do not know most of the past, nor has the future
happened: “The philosophy of history is a discipline for which we mortal men
lack the necessary data” (“Historicism” 110). To buttress this point, Lewis drew
an analogy with a departed father’s old drawer, forgotten, then recovered,
which contained a random assortment of documents, most with no clear value
to the family. Little historical data is actually recoverable or known, Lewis
insisted: “I think the real historian will allow that the actual detritus of the past
[…] is very much more like an old drawer than like an intelligent epitome” (109).
Lewis, arguably, almost rendered impossible the project of a documented
natural law, such as what he himself had offered in Abolition of Man. There,
Lewis had drawn from John Buchanan Riddell’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics to assemble and classify varied moral adages so that he might defend the
proposition of a universal Tao across historic cultures (Hooper, Lewis 330). In
Lewis’s defense, the object in his sights was that a predictive model of the future
could be discovered from the past, not that moral universals are undiscoverable.
Yet this stress on the moral universal carried with it its own problems in regards
to historical judgment. In particular, if there is no pattern to history that is
discoverable, then how does one make moral evaluations as to the past? They
must be made within history, even if they are acknowledged as a form of
objective knowledge and as presuppositionally given for all traditional
cultures.2
Lewis asserted that his argument for natural law was neither a strong return to classical
and medieval natural law nor a covert attempt to introduce necessary theism. His
argument was a softer proposal: that all moral systems share certain broad ethical
presuppositions, and that there is no way to critique these moral truths except from within
the historical system of them (cf. “On Ethics”). As Gilbert Meilaender observes, the moral
2
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Unlike Dawson, who saw sociological findings as one of the structures
of history, Lewis feared a science of history was a threat to human free agency
and to the foundations of human moral decision-making. Lewis was particularly
concerned with those using evolutionary theory, and he had as his target not
only the idealism of Hegel and the dialectical materialism of Marx
(“Historicism” 103), but also the cyclical theories of Oswald Spengler and
Arnold Toynbee. Each imposed a model of the totality upon all the particulars.
In “De Descriptione Temporum,” he spelled out this objection:
I am not, even on the most Lilliputian scale, emulating Professor Toynbee
or Spengler. […] I know nothing of the future, not even whether there
will be any future. I don’t know whether past history has been necessary
or contingent. I don’t know whether the human tragic-comedy is now in
Act I or Act V; whether our present disorders are those of infancy or of
old age. (DT 3).3

This is not to say that Lewis did not also affirm a transcendent
understanding. He insisted that the “primary history” of personal revelation is
what truly mattered, and it was that fundamental accountability before God that
rendered any human story significant:
I mean the real or primary history which meets each of us moment by
moment in his own experience. […] [W]hat MacDonald called ‘the holy
present’. Where, except in the present, can the Eternal be met? If I attack
Historicism it is not because I intend any disrespect to primary history,
the real revelation springing direct from God in every experience. It is
rather because I respect this real original history too much to see with
unconcern the honours due to it lavished on those fragments, copies of
fragments, copies of copies of fragments, or floating reminiscences of
copies of copies, which are, unhappily, confounded with it under the
general name of history. (“Historicism”113)

Lewis’s argument from the existential and personal raises many points of
tension. Formulated, thusly, 1) autobiographical history becomes the ideal
shape and end of history; 2) the study of the larger past seems limited to what
immediate truth it can provide the reader or scholar; 3) the purpose of history
becomes the self (before God, of course) rather than any genuine love of the
truths of the natural law “do not solve moral problems for us; on the contrary, they create,
frame and shape those problems” (121).
3 These were not the only instances of Lewis weighing in against axiomatic change. Even
before his conversion to Christianity, he had trusted Marxist models “in effect, to
dehumanize man” (Starr 38).
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other; and 4) as a result, history as a discipline is relegated to the Platonic
shadows. Ethical and historical judgments, parsed in this manner, would be
highly relativistic, yet these were hardly Lewis’s own practical conclusions. He,
too, valued the historical other, and much of his scholarly work was committed
to helping readers understand a past different than their own culture and time.
In his A Preface to Paradise Lost, he had clearly warned readers against the
delusion of “the method of The Unchanging Human Heart.” The gap between
one’s own context and another historical culture’s cannot be bridged by denying
any significant difference (62-4). Instead, the variances must be studied and
understood, “the effort of the historical imagination” to cross the differences
(72). Lewis’s insistence on historical distance, any more than his treatment of
historical data as a forgotten drawer, was not intended to end in skepticism.
Indeed, he wrote with just the opposite goal in mind.
Despite his suspicion of Christian historicism, Lewis could also make
critiques based upon his Christian belief. As early as his 1946 piece, “Modern
Man and his Categories of Thought,” he had connected “historicism” with
“developmentalism,” and asserted that this was an explicit denial of the biblical
notion of creation and fall, in which “the very standard of good is itself in a state
of flux” (64). Historical examples and contexts, for Lewis, are applicable to each
reader’s “holy present,” which is itself not subject to impersonal laws of material
or idealist history but to transcendent standards and divine encounter. In the
same manner, Lewis could draw from Christian eschatology to resist predictive
history. In “The World’s Last Night,” he insisted that the theory of evolution
had nothing to do with Christian theology (or with Progress and Social
Darwinism, for that matter). The final parousia is “a sudden, violent end
imposed from without,” an end to the play that we cannot read, being that we
are in it (101). Our not knowing what the future holds offers us dramatic
freedom: “The playing it well is what matters infinitely” (106). Indeed, affirming
only a general providentialism kept the historian “from writing a great deal of
nonsense” and “to get on with the story” (OHEL 148).
This “getting on with the story” is key to Lewis’s experience as a
literary historian. Lewis’s flower-cutting analogy underplayed historical
evidence for most fields of research, except the most ancient and Paleolithic.
Historians, even literary historians, as often, need to abbreviate event facts, as
well as distinguish significant ones from what can be ignored. They have to
summarize, classify, and even eliminate the information they have at their
disposal, as did Lewis himself. When we read Lewis’s descriptions of the
historical process, we find we are reading phenomenological accounts, and his
analogies of the drawer, the floral arrangement, or the personal encounter, as
well as general descriptions of the history’s limited purposes, are descriptions
of researching and writing from sources. Because Lewis feared that axiomatic
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causality undercut human choices in the past, he stressed what little historians
knew and described a more epistemically cautious procedure.
Yet this call to hesitancy hardly stopped Lewis from expressing strong,
even wide historical claims, even if he rejected the cyclical claims of Toynbee.
For example, he shared with historians such as Dawson a commitment to a
macrohistorical narrative of the West, one in which the modern world has fallen
from some measure of the goodness of previous eras. Lewis’s “De Descriptione
Temporum” is likely his most well-known example of this meta-story. There,
Lewis was able both to express caution towards historical judgments and also
to paint, nonetheless, a tragic narrative. He admitted that there was “no Great
Divide” (DT 3), at least not ontologically, but the means of the divide allowed
him to consider several possible breaks—between the pagan and Christian
worlds, between the Dark and High Middle Ages, between these and the
Enlightenment. Rather than locating the break of greatest importance between
either the ancient and medieval world, or between the High Middle Ages and
the Renaissance, Lewis argued that the deepest shift took place in the mid and
late nineteenth century with radical changes in politics and aesthetics, as well as
with the general rise of a post-Christian Europe (4-8). He half-mockingly labeled
himself a living fossil of “Old Western Culture,” for he was able to give some
sense of this bygone era to twentieth-century students (8-10, 12-13). Of course,
this was a ruse. Lewis was as much a person of his time as his hearers, but his
appointed moniker did highlight two aspects of himself; namely, that he was a
scholar of the literary past who loved it and that he was a Christian, one invested
in the patristic consensus of Nicene Christianity. This was not to conclude that
Lewis idealized all things ancient and medieval, but he did establish himself as
their sympathetic defender and as an exegete of what he believed most
compatible with Christian truth. At the same time, his history of the centuries
since the High Middle Ages could pinpoint numerous changes that prepared for
his nineteenth-century faultline. Lewis’s jumbled drawer, then, could be
assembled into a rather wide narrative of historical accountability and blame.
THE SUSPENDED MIDDLE
Was Lewis’s history-writing then at odds with his theory? Only up to
a point. Even if we acknowledge no set of covering laws, historiography makes
judgments that link events, and these have ideological frameworks, which was
the substance of Dawson’s objection: “For the Christian view of history is a
vision of history sub specie aeternitatis, an interpretation of time in terms of
eternity and of human events in the light of divine revelation” (248). While it
may be true that history cannot be written with the same causal confidence that
the hard sciences claim, quasi-causal analysis (be it that of colligation,
confirmation, or simple coherency) is at the heart of historiography, including
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Lewis’s. And these analyses tend to have teleological, and therefore implicitly
theological, inferences to which they are joined through suppositions, agents,
and settings. What made this possible for Lewis, then?
I wish to suggest that the disconnections between Lewis’s theory of
history and his actual practice are evidence of the suspended middle of
historical judgment itself, and Lewis’s strong denial of any knowledge of the
future was intended to safeguard the normal telos of human freedom.
Theologian Erich Przywara and philosopher Paul Ricoeur have each offered
phenomenological accounts of human understanding that include the temporal
nature of persons, and as such, they help sketch the reality within which Lewis
himself functioned. Przywara’s Analogia Entis underscored that human beings,
as temporal creatures, possess an openness to the future and human nature in
history points beyond itself to the eternal (124). Lewis clearly held both eternal
and teleological definitions of human essence, and the kind of evaluations that
he practiced—logical, ethical, or aesthetic—asked questions about the nature of
things. Przywara observed that any method we employ to learn about
something uses “the greatest possible immediacy to this formal object” and yet
there is inevitably subjective participation in the matter (133), and Lewis, too,
understood that in every model there is “something of the nature of the artist as
well as something of the object” (“Imagination and Thought in the Middle Ages”
[“Imagination”] 62-63). This extends naturally to the meaning of history.
For Przywara, the analogy of being was a means of engaging and being
engaged by the actual world, “an oscillation without end between two
extremes” of ontology and epistemology (191). Rather than articulating an
absolute union between a historical description and the actual past or dismissing
the description as only fictional, Przywara observed that the principle of noncontradiction offered a humbler assessment of truth (207-10, 216). Lewis’s
attitude towards historical periodization was a strong example of this oscillation
from non-contradiction. History can not mean anything, and given plenty of
evidence to evaluate, what we know forces our generalizations to adapt
themselves. In turn, periodization is neither equivocal fiction (since it reports a
colligation of real behaviors and beliefs), nor is it univocal certainty (i.e. it cannot
claim to know all that can be known or why). Because for Przywara, truth is inand-beyond history, it is neither established apart from history nor relativized as
only history, and this strikes me as very compatible with Lewis. Lewis was
committed to the project of helping readers appreciate the historical context of
classic texts, so no conceptual portrait need ever obtain univocal purity, nor
need it give into equivocal despair; instead, the process of description would
continue in each generation. For example, Lewis noticed that the pre-modern
love of rhetoric “is the greatest barrier between us and our ancestors” because
moderns have no taste for it, yet if that were ever to change, “the whole story

Mythlore 38.2, Spring/Summer 2020  11

“Written by the Finger of God”: C.S. Lewis and Historical Judgment

will have to be rewritten and many judgments may be reversed” (OHEL 61). A
creaturely metaphysics, then, suggests a modest path for historical judgment,
not only in that the truth of cultures is in-and-beyond history, but also in that
past cultures and events keep revealing newly discovered significance.
“Change is never complete,” Lewis observed, “[And yet] nothing is
quite new; it was always somehow anticipated or prepared for” (DT 2). This
temporal and open shape, Ricoeur contended, is why history shares with fiction
a narrative structure. Here, too, we can see a practice that Lewis modeled, and
Ricoeur’s analysis additionally helps us understand why Lewis chose such
methods. Typical plots and standard characters are framing devices for
describing historical periods and behaviors, and they assume some measure of
teleology and essence respectively, even if only as organizing devices. “Plot, in
effect, ‘comprehends’ in one intelligible whole, circumstances, goals,
interactions, and unintended results” (Ricoeur 142). Plot types universalize in
that they merge together contingency and something like necessity, and yet by
their nature, they offer generalizations in order to depart from them. We
generalize human action and historical context in order to effect an analogy
between the past and the present; in this way, they are a narrative form of the
suspended middle. They gesture towards both the general and the unique.
Historical periods, which function like quasi-characters as much as contexts, are
finally unavoidable because it is the nature of explanations to include
conceptualizations, and they must concern themselves with not only the
ontological possibilities of universals and particulars, but also the
epistemological issues of realism and nominalism (Ricoeur 152-3, 226-30). Lewis
practiced all of this in order to understand the literary past; he, too, recognized
the necessity and flexibility of historical descriptions. Arguably, then, Lewis’s
practice of certitude in narrative history fit with the deep structure of a
creaturely metaphysic that made moral judgments possible, while distrusting
axiomatic conclusions. His quasi-characterizations of periods as historical
judgments always functioned analogically because narrative itself is analogical.
“ADDISON” (1945)—HISTORICAL CHARACTERS AND PERIOD CONTEXTS
Lewis’s essay “Addison” (1945) stands at the center of his professional
career and is a good example of his practice, which raised the question of how
essential periodization is to understanding historical characters. “Addison” is an
essay as much about Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift, the Tory satirists, as
it is about Joseph Addison, the Whig essayist, and being so, it offers not only
literary assessments of the three men, but also the socio-cultural contexts that
support them. Lewis’s overviews of a period and its shared mentalities make
ethical or aesthetic evaluation possible, for without such judgments, the
historian or reader is unable to understand the past at all. “Participatory
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belonging,” as Ricoeur put it, is one of the necessities for judging an historical
character’s intentions (194). Lewis took rather complex positions on the writers
and their conversation. The boisterous, even acerbic sarcasm and fun of Pope
and Swift were threatening but defensible as school-boy “high-spirited
rowdiness” (“Addison” 154). Addison’s civil conversation, on the other hand,
even when humorous, would never be marked by a lack of polish or urbane
control. Lewis employed such character generalizations to describe differences
across cultures for his audience. Consider the following passage:
All through the century which Addison ushered in, England was going
to attend more and more seriously to the Freeports, and the de Coverleys
were to be more and more effectually silenced. The figure of the dear old
squire dominates—possibly, on some views, corrupts—the national
imagination to the present day. This is indeed ‘to make a man die
sweetly’. That element in English society which stood against all that
Addison’s party was bringing in is henceforth seen through the mist of
smiling tenderness—as an archaism, a lovely absurdity. What we might
have been urged to attack as a fortress we are tricked into admiring as a
ruin. (“Addison” 156)

According to Lewis, Addison was part of a larger cultural change that continued
up to the present day. To borrow a term from Charles Taylor, Lewis was
describing a shift in “social imaginaries,” that is forms of common social
narrative and metaphor (Taylor 23-30). To offer a context for understanding,
Lewis generalized a social imaginary in which sentimentality was growing in
explanatory power, becoming the tacit ideal of a populace, which was slowly
shifting as to what it had once deemed reasonable.
Historical periods are certainly made up of practices that divide the
world in certain ways, and the era brought about by Addison helped shape the
modern world. Lewis asked his 1945 English audience to consider whether
being the inheritors of this shift, they had not been corrupted, and he wedged in
a lesson in rhetoric and its shaping of their aesthetic and historical judgments.
Words like “archaism” and “lovely absurdity” offered an audience a position of
moral and chronological superiority, yet Lewis also called them to account,
however subtly. The gap between themselves and the traditionalism of Swift
and Pope was far wider, and something had been lost. Lewis did not treat
Addison or Richard Steele as cynical manipulators; indeed, he took the position
that they could not have foreseen the entire effect of their work; they were part
of a change in imaging the world that was wider than themselves.
It is this kind of open-ended characterization and plot that most easily
reflects the trade-off between ontological assertion and epistemological
hesitancy. This historical imaginary is not to be treated as simple causation;
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“events are singular and typical, contingent and expected, deviant and dependent
on paradigms” (Ricouer 208). In the “Addison” essay, common human
experience allowed Lewis to examine various historical changes and yet treat
them as still commensurable for his audience. The contemporary present was
alike yet different than the past, and this analogy could be sympathetically
navigated so that the past was still of import for his readers. Arguably, one could
reduce Lewis’s connections to that of two historical periods without reference
to a universal Tao, yet Lewis clearly thought otherwise. A Tao with broad
categories of moral behavior permitted Lewis to make a point about history and
human freedom. None of the three men in question were entirely tied to their
period, yet each was representative of it. Addison, Pope, and Swift were each
subject to an eighteenth-century stress on “rational piety,” that is a belief that
the sensible person observes the local faith without any unnecessary internal
perplexity over dogma. Yet the three men did not respond in the same way, even
while being subject to their culture and its choices. While Pope, the Roman
Catholic author of “Universal Prayer,” was the least subject to the pressure of a
culturally shared faith, and while Swift’s version was still full of Christian angst
and pain (“Swift still belongs […] to the older world”), Addison’s calm
acceptance was “historically momentous” (“Addison” 157, 160). Lewis tied this
change in faith to another change: that of good breeding, and he observed that
this shift gave the lie to Lewis’s personal temptation to treat his own standards
of mannerly behavior as universal, and in admitting to this, Lewis was assuming
that his 1945 audience shared the standard of propriety that arose with
Addison’s generation. Propriety as a category could be universal yet with
different guidelines.
The differences between the three men, therefore, signified not just
their individual styles and personalities but fundamental shifts that reached
forward and backward in time. Lewis could argue for historical threads,
connecting Swift and Pope to the hilarity of the medieval and yet also to the
narrowness of Renaissance humanism; in turn, he could connect Addison to the
coming Victorians and to Romantic views of the medieval, and yet still prize
Addison as a classicist who at times “touches hands with Scaliger on the one
side and Matthew Arnold on the other” (“Addison” 162). Lewis’s final defense
of Addison was rather telling:
I fully admit that when Pope and Swift are on the heights they have a
strength and splendour which makes everything in Addison look pale;
but what an abyss of hatred and bigotry and even silliness receives them
when they slip from the heights! The Addisonian world is not one to live
in at all times, but it is a good one to fall back into when the day’s work
is over […]. (“Addison” 168)
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Lewis often argued, “To judge between one ethos and another, it is necessary to
have got inside both, and if literary history does not help us to do so it is a great
waste of labour” (OHEL 331). Literary history as a practice assesses each era’s
ethos, seeking to provide analogical bridges to past formative experiences of
understanding, and the varying works of a period allow for a variety of such
experiences. They cannot be reduced to one type alone; they may even escape a
period’s ethos by reaching backward or forward to another’s. Thus, the very idea
that one can bridge the social imaginaries or historical mentalities raises the
question as to what periods actually are. If they may be used analogically, do
they have any ontological reality in and of themselves, or are they better
acknowledged as simply conjectural tools?
“IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES” (1956)—PROJECTING A
PERIOD
Even in Lewis’s generation, not all historians held that one could
uncover anything comprehensive about an era. Lewis, like fellow Oxford
Magdalen scholars R.G. Collingwood and J.A. Smith, fell in the middle ground,
for he understood that periodization is a model rather than an assured set of
facts, and yet at the same time, if one is to imagine why things were significant
to people in the past, one needs a setting by which to assess historical (and
literary) texts (Patrick 127-8). “[T]hough ‘periods’ are a mischievous conception
they are a methodological necessity” (OHEL 64). In his 1957 essay “Is History
Bunk?”, Lewis regarded the end product of historical investigation as a
synchronic picture: “We want to know how such stuff came to be written and
why it was applauded; we want to understand the whole ethos which made it
attractive” (104). The irony is that to make a claim about the ethos of an era, one
must posit that it existed at some level. However, as Lewis understood, one need
not advance that a nameable period has (or had) a separate metaphysical
existence.
Lewis often weighed in against the ontological reality of historical
periods. He quoted with approval British historian G.M. Trevelyan’s maxim that
“periods are not facts” but “retrospective conceptions that we form about past
events, useful to focus discussion, but very often leading historical thought
astray” (DT 2-3).4 Yet Lewis also recalled fondly how Trevelyn taught him about
Walter Scott who taught, in turn, to Thomas Macaulay the historical sense of
It might seem strange that Lewis could praise medieval historiography when it lacked
“the sense of period,” holding that the past is not that different than the writer’s own
times, yet here, too, Lewis’s concern with axiomatic historicism comes to the forefront, and
the best readings of the past were moral expressions of the Tao: “Hector was like any other
knight, only braver.” The saints and kings, lovers and warriors of the past were “friends,
ancestors, patrons in every age” (Discarded Image 174-85).
4
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“feeling for period” (“Sir Walter Scott” 217-18). As exemplified by his “Addison”
essay, without a sense of period, it is harder for a contemporary reader to bridge
the divide in understanding, as well as for the historian to write about such
understanding: “The worst method of all, in my opinion, would be to accept the
first impression that the old text happens to make on a modern sensibility” (“De
Audiendis Poetis” 4). The contemporary scholar or reader has to seek proximity
to the past through points of relational similarity, even when trying to parse out
the differences; one cannot run roughshod over its historical otherness.
How, then, given these concerns, could Lewis’s actual use of historical
periods function so confidently?5 In 1956, for example, he addressed the
Zoological Laboratory at Cambridge on the topic “Imagination and Thought in
the Middle Ages.” As Walter Hooper points out, the two-day lecture served as
a précis for Lewis’s later The Discarded Image (“Preface” viii). Lewis summarized
high medieval conceptions of the cosmos, including the size of the universe, its
orderly nature, its hierarchical pattern, its natural and supernatural inhabitants,
and its triadic organizing structures, the later which encompassed aesthetic,
ethical, social, and metaphysical elements. Such a project involved
generalization, as Lewis himself admitted. But to simply encapsulate was not
enough for Lewis, for he also set out to shape his modern audience’s
imagination, in this case an audience made up of mostly Cambridge scientists.
At several points, for example, Lewis offered a different master
metaphor than the one he expected that his audience held without much
question. In particular, he wanted to counter an anthropological picture of
religion as primitive evolutionary residuals, as well as a determinist view of
interstellar space as an empty and infinite terror. To confront the first, Lewis
admitted to something of a historical genealogy of certain beliefs, but only to
seriously discount its value: He conceded that one might trace back the medieval
belief in angels, demons, and fairies through a long series of written texts until
one reached an ancient Attic world, and such a world perhaps could be said to
approximate the pre-logical society of anthropologists, but such a world was as
distant from the highly bookish milieu of medieval intellectual culture as that of
twentieth-century Britain (“Imagination” 41-3). Lewis stressed that
“Characteristically, medieval man was not a dreamer nor a spiritual adventurer;
he was an organizer, a codifier, a man of system” (44). Admittedly, the world of
the troubadour was closer to the oral, pre-logical one, but Lewis insisted that
Lewis has often been criticized for this: David Lyle Jeffrey, for example, while praising
Lewis’s coverage of the texts of Late Antiquity, holds that Lewis often projects nineteenthcentury medievalist notions back on to the actual Middle Ages (79-83). Michael Price has
a similar critique to make of Lewis’s coverage of John Donne (142-3), as does Doris Myers
of his treatment of Spenser (95-7).
5
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they were not at the center of high medieval culture and that current interest in
them was a product of eighteenth and nineteenth-century Romanticism. As
heirs to a pre-twentieth-century approach, moderns exaggerated the openended and boundless ineffable as a key to medieval culture, rather than the
actual practice of its textual and logical actuality. Lewis suggested that it was
better to understand the systematic and orderly mind of the medieval by paying
attention to Gothic cathedrals, Aquinas’s Summa, or Dante’s Commedia. Rather
than pre-logical and intuitive, the medieval mind was credulous yet always
about harmonization.
To understand this approach to harmonization, especially when it
comes to cosmology, a modern has to revisit his or her own inherited image of
the universe. To understand the medieval imagination, “[t]he motions of the
universe are to be conceived not as those of a machine or even an army, but
rather as a dance, a festival, a symphony, a ritual, a carnival, or all these in one”
(“Imagination” 60). In essence, Lewis treated such a high medieval conception
as a social imaginary and invited his audience to entertain its analogical,
emotional, and aesthetic states of being. Certainly, Lewis’s appeals to the
codifier and the systematizer were ones with which he hoped to engage his
audience of researchers, yet he also worked to help them envision the medieval
universe as a “great, complex work of art,” such as those of Milton, Euclid,
Spinoza, or Beethoven (“Imagination” 49). He urged them to allow for the
differing analogies that medieval science would have appealed to, such as an
object’s desire for its end. In doing this, Lewis understood that his scientific
audience was only too aware of the way we use analogies to describe scientific
phenomena, and he insisted that the form of the analogy shaped how one
responds to the universe, “whether you fill your universe with phantom policecourts and traffic regulations, or with phantom longings and endeavours”
(“Imagination” 50).
At first glance, we would seem to be worlds apart here from Lewis’s
cut flowers or rediscovered drawer. To speak of the medieval era as he did
before the Cambridge Zoological Laboratory, Lewis had to employ a highly
overdetermined set of data, and he wove together a rather complex picture that
reinforced his generalizations. Yet this actually parallels well some aspects of his
analogies. Because he was a literary critic and historian, he drew from numerous
texts to build this portrait. He was always aware that the picture he offered was
colligative, even at points conjectural. That all of this relied on assertive
simplification did not seem to threaten Lewis, and that such a figure was a
composite did not surprise him or really endanger his project. He openly
acknowledged that “most people would now admit that no picture of the
universe we can form is ‘true’ in quite the sense our grandfathers hoped”
(“Imagination” 62); rather, the question was which models suggest a more
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beautiful, human existence. This was not just an admission that the science of
the Ptolemaic universe was wrong; it was also an admission that world pictures
are built upon shifts in mentalities, including the modern one. Implicitly Lewis’s
address had a tragic quasi-plot. He wondered before the scientists present for
his second lecture, “What our own models—if you continue to allow us models
at all—will reflect, posterity may judge” (“Imagination” 63). Such an ending
perhaps only feigned helplessness for a literary scholar like Lewis, but it did
offer a pungent question.
By the time that Lewis published his longer version in The Discarded
Image, he set out a more complex view of science. In its epilogue, he cautioned
that “we should misrepresent the historical process if we said that the irruption
of new facts was the sole cause of the alteration” (219). Instead, “when changes
in the human mind produce a sufficient disrelish of the old Model and a
sufficient hankering for some new one, phenomena to support that new one will
obediently turn up” (221). Lewis was not only aware that the details of
historiography change as new evidence is discovered or as new questions are
asked, he also understood what Thomas Kuhn would make famous in the
history of science; namely, that paradigms do alter our reading of the past
(Martin 346). The question for Lewis was as much one of quality as of accuracy,
and, being that there can be no absolute human accuracy, which models provide
some measure of humanity. Periodization, then, could be employed with the
understanding that it was subject to revision.
“NEW LEARNING AND NEW IGNORANCE” (1943-1954)—HISTORIOGRAPHY AND
IDEOLOGY
As both his “Addison” essay and his address to the Zoological
Laboratory suggest, Lewis did not use the language of historical character and
period for bridging only the sympathy gap between current audiences and the
social imaginaries of the past; he also invested historical periods with ideological
importance, for they are also moral imaginaries, not only in that they function
as comparative analogies to the present, but also in that they offer genealogies
of contemporary successes and failures. In practice, as we have seen, Lewis
could acknowledge the limits of literary period modeling. Throughout English
Literature in the Sixteenth Century, he provided examples of poets who either fit
or did not fit the model in question, who functioned as transitions, as test cases,
as unexplained anomalies, or as variations on a theme—each acting to both
affirm and give the lie to the model or tradition in question (cf. OHEL 464, 469,
476, 481, 523, 531). “‘Periods’ are largely an invention of the historians. The poets
themselves are not conscious of living in any period and refuse to conform to
the scheme” (OHEL 106). Yet the language of historical periods is still a
necessary tool if one is to trace the genealogy of influence across time and space.
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Like his portraits of Addison, Pope, and Swift, Lewis chose to treat writers, not
only as part of a period, but also as partaking of various periods. The subject in
question could not only share in one period of reflection but also inhabit older
points of consensus and anticipate coming ones.6 For instance, when discussing
the Scottish writer Gavin Douglas, Lewis could place him as standing in the
medieval and ancient tradition while opposing the new renascentia. Douglas
shared the medieval “blindness” of treating the underworld of Virgil’s Aeneid in
Christian terms, yet Lewis does not regard this as “a very heavy” blindness, for
Douglas’s medievalism partook more of the ancient world than the new learning
did. At the least, Lewis judged, Douglas was “no further out in one direction
than many Virgilians are out in the other” (OHEL 86).
Yet Lewis’s willingness to treat historical periods as ideological quasiplots was clearly evident in his introductory chapter, “New Learning and New
Ignorance.” The title signaled a controversial stance: from the get go, Lewis
rejected a Whig history of unidirectional progress, and he insisted that a literary
historian must focus on what mattered to the era in question, yet it was also clear
that Lewis did not have high praise for the Ciceronian rhetoricians of the new
humanism or for the Puritans who in some cases followed in their wake. He
recognized that because British education was the descendent of Renaissance
classicism, it was difficult for certain readers to entertain a less than exemplary
notion of the Ciceronians. Indeed, the standard language of periodization—
Ancient, Medieval, Modern—arose from their self-appointed rejection of the
centuries before them: “And what can media imply except that a thousand years
of theology, metaphysics, jurisprudence, courtesy, poetry, and architecture are
to be regarded as a mere gap, or chasm, or entre-acte?” (OHEL 20). Lewis charged
the humanists with losing the ability to read the ancients for their poetic
greatness because as rhetoricians they held to a thin standard of Latin style and
decorum. The humanist rejection of scholasticism and of the medieval romance
was fundamentally a fear of being considered vulgar, rather than a willingness
to engage with any seriousness the questions of metaphysics (20-30).7 But, then,

The common complaint against The Discarded Image, that Lewis reduces the complexity
and diversity of the medieval period to a single picture, should be weighed against this
understanding of Lewis’s. For example, Robert Boenig believes that Lewis’s description
of the European Middle Ages is too uniform, tending to lump together differing ethnic
regions, as well as differing classes and social groupings. He charges that Lewis tends to
project the writings of the intelligentsia back onto the rural and town cultures (29-30). Yet
Lewis understood quite well that a generalized ethos is subject to numerous individual
(and subcultural) variations and conflicts, and one suspects he would take such criticism
to heart.
7 Donald T. Williams assesses the changes in scholarly responses to Lewis’s picture here.
Most would agree that Lewis draws a one-sided portrait in need of balance, yet some have
6
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Lewis speculated, “Perhaps every new learning makes room for itself by
creating a new ignorance” (31). Such a statement was as close as Lewis came to
an historical axiom.
Lewis also allowed this axiom to shape his overall discussion of the
period. He made similar observations about high magic, the new geography, the
first stages of European colonialism, the new political theory of the divine right
of kings, the changes in modern authorship, and the growth of Puritanism. He
highlighted these in order to counter traditional and contemporary
preconceptions about the period. In the latter case, he found himself reflecting
on the pros and cons of historical analogies: “Modern parallels are always to
some extent misleading. Yet, for a moment only, and to guard against worse
conceptions, it may be useful to compare the influence of Calvin on that age with
the influence of Marx on our own” (OHEL 42). The problematic historical
analogy was still a useful structure. Lewis held that the first Puritans were
actually the radical left-wing of their day, both in their doctrinaire passion and
their insensitivity to the more horrible implications of their systems: “[W]e may
suspect that those who read it with most approval were troubled by the fate of
predestined vessels of wrath just about as much as young Marxists in our own
age are troubled by the approaching liquidation of the bourgeoisie” (43). He
furthermore suggested that just as the hard-core Marxist is surrounded by
fashionable dilettantes, so Calvinism had had both its radical center and its less
serious fringe (44). Again, Lewis understood that such general characterizations
were not entirely effective when describing actual individuals, and he
acknowledged that the humanist and the Puritan could often be the same
person. Both considered themselves the cultural new wave, hoping to sweep
away the old corrupt standard. Yet Lewis recognized in Calvinism a Zeitgeist
that shared the deterministic element of Renaissance astrologers and magicians
and the period’s affective element that placed a high value on the human person.
Given such strong, even antipathetic positions on the period, it may
still seem surprising that Lewis held to his basic mistrust of periodization, but
in light of his sense of the suspended middle of historical judgment, it is not too
surprising. With good reason, he thought, he mostly avoided the term
“Renaissance” because it no longer meant for the average reader the humanist
revolution in learning. All that this really did was encourage modern
distortions, either in painting the Reformation as “almost nothing but liberation
and enlightenment” or, in reaction to this, as “the destruction of a humane and
Christian culture” (OHEL 55-6). Perhaps aware that his own portrait of the
period had tended in this direction, Lewis apologized that he offered “no model

begun to understand what Lewis was gesturing towards and see his extreme as a
corrective of an earlier one (152-4).

20  Mythlore 136, Spring/Summer 2020

Philip Irving Mitchell

of neatness,” for “it is too neat, too diagrammatic, for the facts.” The historian
he warned “must beware of schematizing” and must remember that individuals
could combine opposed positions: “a Protestant may be Thomistic, a humanist
may be a Papist, a scientist may be a magician, a sceptic may be an astrologer”
(63).
Why, then, did Lewis write with such assurance only to undercut it at
the end? I suspect it was humility. The method of analogical historiography
would not claim for itself a science of assured predictability, nor even an assured
genealogy of moral decay or progress. Lewis was only too aware that human
learning could not with justice claim absolute knowledge, so neither then could
its historical suppositions and conclusions operate as if they were irrefutably
certain—a certainty he would not extend to the paradigms of modern science
either. Of course, Lewis still had faith in human universals and in natural law;
behavior was basically normative across space and time, even if the particular
shape of these norms morphed somewhat. Having told a good story with
arresting characters, Lewis, ever the Christian Platonist, admitted that the
meaning of the story may be but “pictures we see in the fire.” The more assured
one is about the Zeitgeist, the less the period has likely been examined (63). Yet
if history cannot provide predictable laws about the past, present, or future,
neither should it be reduced to equivocation. The practice of history involves
some measure of probability and can be argued by a redrawing of the lines of
historical evidence via counter-narratives and counter-descriptions, and such
narratives have at their heart assumptions about human nature and human
purposes. Nevertheless, the lessons that one draws from the past still speak, and
the models are still applicable. If truth is in-and-beyond history, then such
lessons should be asserted with conviction, even as one realizes that they may
yet be subject to the say of one’s descendants.
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